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IN THE SUPRE}1E COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent 
v. 
VINCENT L. BELGARD, 
Defendant-Appellant 
Case No. 15743 
REBUTTAL BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATE}1ENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from a conviction of Automobile Homicide, 
a Third Degree Felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. §76-5-207 
(1953 as amended) in the Third Judicial District Court in and 
for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable Jay E. Banks, 
Judge presiding. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The appellant, VINCENT L. BELGARD, was charged by Information 
with the offense of Automobile Homicide, a Third Degree Felony, 
in violation of Utah Code Ann. §76-5-207 (1953 as amended) 
(T.6, Vol. II). On November 17, 1977, the appellant was convicted 
by a jury of the offense charged in the Information. On March 17, 
1978, the appellant was sentenced by the above entitled court, 
the Honorable Jay E. Banks, Judge presiding, to zero to five years 
at the Utah State Prison. Appellant has previously filed two 
briefs in this matter and offers this brief in rebuttal to 
respondent's brief. 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The appellant, VINCENT L. BELGARD, seeks reversal of 
the judgment of guilt entered against him and a remand of 
the instant case to the trial court for new trial. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Appellant submits the Statement of Facts offered in 
the original Brief of Appellant submitted in the instant 
case. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
CHAVEZ ~ST BE RETP,OACTIVELY APPLIED. 
Contrary to respondent's assertion (R's brief pp. 73,74) 
State v. Chavez, 605 P. 2d 1226 (Utah 1980) is a case of substat: 
law and in no way procedural. Further, respondent apparently:: 
no criminal case where a true holding on substantive la~·1 (as oi; 
Constitutional due process, and true procedural law) is limited 
to prospective application only. 
In Chavez, supra, appellant ran a red light, causing a 
collision which resulted in the death of a two-year old child. 
The concentration of ethyl alcohol in appellant's blood, some 
two hours after the collision, was .19% (approximately 2.4 time 
the statutory presumption of intoxication). Appellant was con·: 
of Automobile Homicide in violation of Utah Code Ann. §76-s-zo· 
(1953 as amended) of the Utah Criminal Code. At the trial. 
appellant requested an instruction that criminal negligence wa: 
-2-
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an element of the offense charged, pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. §76-2-103(4). The trial court rejected appellant's 
request and instructed that simple negligence was sufficient 
to convict. The trial court apparently based its ruling on 
three recent Utah cases, State v. Durrant, 561 P.2d 1056 (Utah 
1977), State v. Anderson, 561 P.2d 1061 (Utah 1977) and 
State v. Wade, 572 P.2d 398 (Utah 1977). 
This Court reversed appellant's conviction, and Durrant, 
Anderson and Wade, all supra, and in effect adopted the dissenting 
view of Justice Maughan in Durrant, supra. 
It should be here noted that respondent's suggestion that 
the individual defendants in the above three cases, among 
"several convicted felons" might somehow obtain "release" 
(R.79) as a result of Chavez, supra, being applied to the case 
at bar, is actually absurd, as will be discussed infra. For 
the present, suffice it to say that final judgments are not 
subject to collateral attack. 
Under the theory of Chavez, supra, it is recognized that 
the Utah Criminal Code, Title 76 Utah Code Ann. (as amended) is 
a comprehensive statute. Under §76-2-101, one must act with 
criminal intent to be guilty of a crime. The culpable state of 
mind required for a conviction can be no less than "criminal 
negligence" as defined by §76-2-103(4). Under §76-5-207 (1), 
negligence is required for a conviction. In order to 
reconcile the apparent contradiction between §§76-2-101, 76-2-103(4) 
and §76-5-207(1) negligence must be construed to mean criminal 
-3-
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negligence. The trial court instructed as to tort negligence. 
This court held that to be reversible error, noting: 
"A higher level of culpability is required under 
§76-2-103(4) than is defined in Instruction 18." 
(605 P.2d at 1227) 
The Court continued: 
We are therefore of the opinion that our previous 
cases holding that automobile homicide requires 
only proof of simple negligence under §76-5-207 
are in ~. and are overruled. And we hold that 
a conviction of automobile homicide requires an 
instruction on criminal negligence as that term 
is defined in §76-2-103(4), and a determination 
thereof ~ the ~- As the Courts instruction 18 
defined simple negfigence and not criminal 
negligence, defendant is entitled to a new trial. 
(605 P.2d at 1228, Emphasis Supplied) 
Nowhere is procedure mentioned, and respondent's attempts 
to so characterize the case are disingenuous, Although the 
erroneous instruction was clearly reversible error, this does 
not make the case procedural. The thrust of Chavez, supra goes 
not to ins true t ions . P_a ther, it goes to what the law actually~ 
and has been since 1973, as to the offense of Automobile Homiciei 
Chavez, supra, deals with the very substance of the law, 
stating that conduct is an offense under the Code only if crimir 
negligence, at least, is present. Indeed, Chavez, supra, is 
substantive law by definition. According to Black's: 
Substantive Law. That part of law which creates, 
defines, and regulates rights, as opposed to "adjective 
or remedial law," which prescribes method of . 
enforcing the rights or obtaining redress for their 
invasion. That which creates duties, rights and 
obligations:--WOi~rocedural or reme~ial lawrr 
prescribes metFiOdS Q_ enforcement of rights ~r 
70 obtainin~ redress, Kilbreath v. RUcfy, 16 Ohio St. 2d ' 
242 N.E. d 658, 660, 45 0.0.2d 370. The basic law 
of rights and duties (contract law, criminal law 
-4-
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tort law, law of wills, etc.) as opposed to 
procedural law (law of pleading law of evidence 
law of jurisdiction, etc.) ' 
(Black's Law Dictionary, 5th Ed., 
p. 1281, Emphasis Supplied) 
§76-5-207 under Chavez, supra, creates a duty to refrain 
from certain conduct and is clearly substantive in nature. 
Chavez, supra, goes directly to the facts that constitute an 
offense, unlike such "procedural" matters as the law of search 
and seizure, arrest, confessions, privilege, evidence in general, 
jurisdiction, and the like. Cases such as Schmerber v. 
California, 384 U.S. 757, 16 L.Ed.2d 908, 86 S.Ct. 1826 (1966), or 
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 16 L.Ed.2d 694, 86 S.Ct. 1602 
(1966) are clearly procedural, as is the law under Utah's Code 
of Criminal Procedure (Title 77, Utah Code Ann.). The law of 
Chavez, supra and the Utah Criminal Code is just as surely 
substantive. Chavez, supra, defined the law at the time the 
instant alleged offense was committed. 
The mere fact that the substantive error in law made by the 
trial judge transmitted itself through an erroneous instruction of 
law does not make this a procedural case. Quite the opposite. 
Charges to the jury on matters of procedure are rare indeed. 
The applicability of Chavez, supra to the instant case is 
obvious. The operative facts of the two cases cannot be 
distinguished. In both cases a traffic collision resulted in 
the death of an innocent party. In both cases the defendant 
driver's blood levels of alcohol exceeded the presumption 
of intoxication (.08%) set out in §41-6-44(b)(3). In both cases, 
defendant requested a correct instruction of the law, which was 
-5-
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refused by the trial court on authority of Durrant, Wade and 
Anderson, all supra. 
Respondent stresses "that appellant's trial occurred 
years prior to the Chavez decision." (R. 70). It should be 
noted that the actual events which gave rise to the prosecutic: 
in both Chavez, supra, and the case at bar, occurred seven days 
apart. Appellant was actually convicted some five months befo: 
Johnny Chavez even though the Chavez appeal was decided by thi: 
Court prior to the instant appellant. 
It seems clear that had the instant case come before thi 
Court nrior to Chavez, supra, it would have been reversed on th! 
same ground. It seems absurd that the result would be differe: 
because it reached this Court later, instead of before Chavez, 
supra. 
Technically, Chavez, supra did not change the law. The 
law was set out by the Legislature through the Utah Criminal 
Code and became effective on July 1, 1973 (76-1-102). In 
Durrant, Anderson and Wade, all supra, this Court erroneously 
cons trued the law. In theory, Chavez, supra, merely corrected 
these errors, it did not change the substantive law of 
§76-5-207. In such a case, the "Blackstonian View". alluded t: 
in respondent's brief (R.71) is entirely appropriate. 
The Blacks tone position is explored, in the due process 
sphere, by Rossum, New Rights and Old Wrongs: The Supreme~ 
and the Problem of Retroactivity, 23 Emory Law Journal 381, Jli 
As to retroactive application of judicial decisions, the 
underlying logic of the position is perhaps stated best by 
-6-
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Blackstone himself: 
.. subsequent judges do not pretend to make a 
new law, but to vindicate the old one from 
misrepresentation. For if it be found that the 
former decision is manifestly absurd or unjust 
it is declared, not that such a sentence was ' 
bad law, but that it was not law; that it has 
been erroneously determine-a:- ~-
(23 Emory Law Journal at 386, emohasis 
originally supplied by Blackstone.) 
As Rossum, supra, ably points out, this Blackstone doctrine 
is both defended and condemned by various legal scholars, as to 
its applicability in cases involving criminal procedure under 
the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and the 
Bill of Rights. The article, however, does not discuss the 
doctrine in cases of substantive criminal law. 
Since the position respondent advocates is in effect the 
definition of the offense of automobile homicide under the law 
prior to the adoption of the Utah Criminal Code, (i.e. simple 
negligence is sufficient to convict), the so-called "Blackstonian 
view" is mandated by §76-1-103 (1) which states: 
§76-1-103. Application of code-Offense prior to effective 
date.- (1) The provisions of this code shall govern 
the construction of, the punishment for, and defenses 
against any offense defined in this code or, except w~ere 
otherwise specifically provided or the context otherwise 
requires, any offense defined outside this code; . 
rovided such offense was committed after the effective 
ate o t is co e. Emp asis Supp ie 
This is clearly indicated by the dissent of Justice Maughan 
in State v. Durrant, 561 P.2d 1056, 1058 (Utah 1977), where it is 
noted; 
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Ordinary or simple negligence was all that was 
necessary to convict one of automobile homicide 
under prior Utah law as set forth in §76-30-7.4 
as enacted 1957. [Citation omitted] However ' 
this statute was repealed when the new Utah ' 
Criminal Code was enacted in 1973. 
(561 P.2d at 1059, 1060) 
The new Code became effective in 1973. The events out 
of which both Chavez, supra, and the case at bar arose occurred 
in July of 1977. The provisions of the new Code governed, 
under §76-1-103, and the new Code as adopted by the legislature 
of this state ex-pressly required as an element of all offenses, 
including Automobile Homicide, that a criminal intent, at least 
criminal negligence, be found by the jury to exist beyond a 
reasonable doubt. 
Respondent claims that, 
At the time the instant case was tried, the reversal 
this Court would make in [Chavez, supra] was totally 
unforseeable. (R.78) 
This is simply not so. A reading of the Utah Criminal Coe• 
reveals, to all but a layman. that the ehavez. supra, result is 
completely consistant with established practices of statutory 
construction. Further, the undeniable fact is that this result 
was clearly foreseen by not only appellant's counsel in the 
instant case, but Johnny Chavez's counsel in that case as well 
In fact, counsel for appellant Belgard at trial also was co-coun 
in the Chavez case. 
Respondent's brief, Point IV, is somewhat confusing, if 
not mis leading, on the doctrine of retroactive application in 
1 11 t t · appli· cati· on of Constitutional genera , as we as re roac ive 
-8-
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procedural guarantees. A short excerpt from Gunther's Cases and 
Materials on Constitutional Law (Foundation Press 1975) 
pp.546-7, serves to clarify the issues involved. 
3. Incorporation and. the retro~ctivity problem. Ordinarily, 
newl announced doctrines are iven full retroactive effect 
y American courts: the new standard is apolicable to all 
ca~es endin in th7 ·udicial s stem. That general 
princip e was perceive as a su stantial brake on the 
incorporation of new constitutional rights into the due 
process clause: especially in light of the availability 
of collateral challen es via habeas corpus, the concern 
was t at expansion o edera rig ts applicable in state 
criminal proceedings would flood the federal courts and 
open the prison gates by permitting the invocation of 
the new rules by prisoners whose convictions had long 
become final for direct review purposes. Those 
pragmatic considerations no doubt played a major role 
in inducing the Court to announce a major exceution 
to the normal retroactivity rule in the midst of the 
rapid growth of selective incorporation during the 1960's. 
The legitimacy of those exceptions, and the appropriate 
contours of permissible prospectivity, have produced 
sharp divisions on and off the Court. 
(a) A majority endorsed de~artures from the ordinary 
retroactivity rule in Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618 
(1965). The Court announced that "the Constitution 
neither prohibits nor requires retrospective effect" 
for new rulings. The proper approach was to "weigh 
the merits and demerits" of retroactivity in each case 
"by looking to the prior history of the rule in . 
question, its purpose and effect, and whether retorspective 
operation will further or retard its operation." 
(Justice Black's dissent, joined by Justice Douglas, 
insisted in this case and many later ones, that departures 
from fuli retroactivity were discriminatory and unjustified.) 
Two years later, Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293 (1967) 
articulated more fully the criteria which have since 
governed the Court's choice_betw7e~ retroacti~ity and 
prospectivity: "The criteria guiding resolution of the 
question implicate (a) the purpose to be served by the 
new standards, (b) the extent of the reliance by law 
enforcement authorities on the old standards, and (c)_the 
effect on the administration of justice of a retroactive 
application of the new standards." 
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(b) In Linkl7t~er and other ea:ly decisions rejecting 
full retroactivity, the Court did not require ·~ure 
prospecti~ity": the new con~titutio~al requireCTents 
were a lied to all cases still pendin on direct 
review at t e time the new rule was announce . That 
was so in Linkletter, for example, involving the 
new exclusionary rule of Mapp v. Ohio. In later cases 
the Court moved closer to "pure prospectivity". By th~ 
time of Stovall v. Denno, some new rulings were found 
purely prospective except with respect to the parties 
in the immediate cases before the Court. The fact that 
the Supreme Court challengers were the only retroactive 
beneficiaries of the new rules was described in Stovall 
as "an unavoidable consequence of the necessity ~
constitutional adjudications not stand as mere dictum.'' 
The Stovall majority recognized that such a cut-off 
point made the challengers "chance beneficiaries" of the 
new rules, but thought the 11 anomalies 11 justified by 
the desirability of the prospectivity technique- a 
technique facilitating "the implementation of long-overd'J' 
reforms, which otherwise could not be practicably 
effected." (Emphasis Added) 
It bears noting that the status of the instant case was no: 
collateral attack on a conviction, but rather a direct appetl. 
This case was pending within the judicial system at the time 
Chavez, supra was decided. Therefore, even if this were a 
procedural case where a new Constitutional standard had been 
applied, the new "rule" would properly be apl'licable here. 
As previously noted however, the case at bar is not 
procedural. The cases respondent cites to bolster its 
position that Chavez, supra, be limited to prospective applicat: 
are wholly inapplicable. tfiranda, supra, Johnson v. New Jers~ 
384 U.S. 719, 16 L.Ed. 2d 882, 86 S.Ct. 1772 (1966) Adams v. 
Illinois, 405 U.S. 278, 31 L.Ed. 2d 202, 92 S.Ct. 916 (1972) 
and Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 18 L.Ed. 2d 1199, 87 S.Ct. 
f d Further, even un'' 1967 (1967), are purely matters o proce ure. 
the criteria of Johnson, supra, the instant law (not procedural 
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rule) would be retroactively applied. 
The purpose of Chavez, supra.and the Utah Criminal Code, is 
to prevent and punish culpable behavior, i.e. behavior that is 
at least criminally negligent. The administration of 
justice can only be furthered by granting a criminal defendant 
a trial on the facts and the law; the correct law. Justice is 
served only when the jury is required to find beyond a reasonable 
all of the elements of the offense charged, in order to return 
doubt 
a verdict of guilty. Since appellant did rely on the law, and since 
he was convicted without the jury having been required to find 
all of the elements of the charged offense, his conviction must 
be reversed. 
As to the reliance criterion stated in Stovall v. Denno, 
supra, it should be noted that the relevant reliance is that of 
law enforcement officers, in making. decisions on procedural 
matters, such as an accused's right to counsel at a line-up. 
While respondent is no doubt correct that 
"The trial judge's reliance [on Waded Durrant and 
Anderson, all supra] was made in goo faith(,]" 
(R.78) 
such reliance cannot serve as a ground for limiting 
Chavez, supra, to prospective application. Triers of law are 
allowed no such reliance in determining what the law is, or is 
not. 
Further, the state was not prejudiced by any reliance here. 
Indeed, appellant, at trial, relied on the clear language of 
the Code in requesting a correct instruction of the law. That 
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this proper request was refused cannot now be turned into some 
species of "reliance" by the prosecution. 
Respondent cites Wainright v. Stone, 414 U.S. 21, 38 L.Ed 
2d 179, 94 S.Ct. 190 (per curiam 1973) in support of its 
position. That case is readily distinguishable and totally 
inapplicable to the case at bar. There, the highest State 
Court had ruled that its "infamous crimes against nature" statu:' 
was unconstitutionally vague, violating due process. This stat, 
was over one hundred years old, and had acquired a considerable 
judicial gloss. The Supreme Court of the United States held th; 
the State Supreme Court had the power to make its decision then 
retroactive, or prospective only. 
Wainright v. Stone, supra, is similar to the instant case, 
in that it dealt with the very substance of what conduct consfr 
a criminal offense. There, the subsequent change in the law 
was not a correction of former judicial error in construing a 
comprehensive criminal code. The "change" was the total abolit' 
of the offense charged, because the statute which made the conci' 
a crime was void for vagueness on its face. 
Wainright v. Stone, supra, is a per curiam opinion some 
two pages long. While appellant concedes its correctness as 
to result, it is nevertheless based on a questionable rationale 
The convictions there had been affirmed after direct 
appeal in the State courts. The case was one of a collateral 
attack on the final judgment of conviction by application for 
federal habeas corpus relief, based on a change in the law. 
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Interestingly, in the opinion that had found the infamous 
crimes against nature statute void, Franklin v. State, 357 So.2d 
21 (Fla. 1971), another per curiam decision, the Supreme 
Court of Florida stated: 
"In :'iew of our former decisions, this judgment 
holding the felony statute void is not retroactive 
but prospective only. (257 So. 2d at 25) 
The Florida Court did not specify what the date of 
retroactivity would be. Nor did it adopt a true prospective 
application, since there the rule was applied to the case actually 
before the Court, while the true "prospective only" doctrine 
(also known as the "Sunburst doctrine") applies the changed 
law only to subsequent cases. The parties to the action are 
bound by the old law. See Great Northern Railway v. Sunburst 
Oil & Refining Co., 287 U.S. 358, 77 L.Ed. 360 53 S.Ct. 145 
(1932). 
The Supreme Court of the United States, in Wainright v. 
Stone, supra, seemed to base its holding on the Florida Supreme 
Court's statement of "prospective only" application. 
Appellant points out that the result in Wainright v. Stone, supra, 
is the same under a more widely accepted theory: final judgments 
are not subject to collateral attack based on a subsequent 
change in the substantive law. See U.S. ex rel. Randall v. United 
States Marshal, 143 F.2d 830 (2d Cir. 1944) Massey v. United 
States, 291 U.S. 608, 7S L.Ed. 1019, 54 S. Ct. 532 (193b.). 
In the case at bar, there is nothing offensive with the statute 
in question. Rather, it had been erroneously construed in certain 
prior cases, so as to allow conviction without proof of all the 
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elements required by the statute. In the instant case, thereto: 
the prospective-only application argued by respondent is not 
only inappropriate, but it would surely violate due process 
of law as guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution, and Article I Section 7 of the Utah 
Constitution, in allowing a conviction of a crime without 
proof of all the elements of the offense. In such a case, 
where all the statutory rigors had previously gone uncomplied 
with by the State in obtaining felony convictions against 
defendants (as opposed to where the statute is void for vaguene: 
retroactive application is compelled. 
The doctrine of retroactivity of judicial decisions is so 
engrained in Ar:J.erican law that it is difficult to find appella:: 
court decisions directly on point with the case at bar. 
An examination of the caselaw, however, quickly indicates the 
soundness of appellant's contention that Chavez, supra, be giver 
retroactive application to the instant appeal. 
An early case is United States v. Schooner Peggy, 1 Crane: 
103, 2 L. Ed. 49 (1801). The case is of historical interest, 
but more importantly, it is closely on point to the case at 
bar. The schooner Peggy was a French vessel which was seized 
by American privateers on April 23, 1800. On this date, 
the United States and France were in a state of "partial war". 
The circuit court for the district of Connecticut reversed the 
decision of the district judge, and decreed that the schooner 
Peggy, and her cargo were "lawful prize", and 
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the same ~re hereby condemned as forfeited to the 
use of United States, and of the officers and men 
of the Trumbull, one-half thereof to the United 
States, the other half to the officers and men, 
This sentence and decree were pronounced on the 
23d day of September, 1800. 
(2 L.Ed. at 50) 
On the 30th of September, 1800, a convention between 
France and the United States was signed in Paris. Article 4 of 
this convention provided 
"Property captured, and not yet definitely 
condemned .. shall be mutally restored." 
(2 L. Ed. at 50) 
On February 18, 1801 this convention was partially 
ratified by the President of the United States, with the 
consent of the Senate. Final ratification occurred on 
December 21, 1801. 
On appeal, the Supreme Court of the United States, in an 
opinion written by Chief Justice Marshall, reversed the Circuit 
Court, and restored the schooner Peggy and its cargo to the 
French. The Chief Justice noted first that 
This vessle is not considered as being definitely 
condemned. The argument at the bar which contends 
that because the sentence of the circuit court 
is denominated a final sentence. therefore its 
condemnation is definitive in the sense in which 
that term is used in the treaty, is not deemed a 
correct argument .... The last decree of an 
inferior court is final in relation to the power of 
that court, but not in relation to the property 
itself unless it be acquiesced under .... 
' (2 L.Ed. at 50 Emphasis Supplied) 
As to the retrospective application of a change in the 
substantive law, the Chief Justice stated: 
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It has been urged that the court can take no noti 
of the stipulation for the restoration of propert~e 
not yet definitively conderrmed; that the judges 
can only inquire whether the sentence was 
erroneous when delivered and that if the 
judgment ~as correct, it.cannot be made otherwise 
by any thing subsequent to its rendition .... 
governs, t e law 
In such a case the court must decide according 
to existing laws, and if it be necessary to set 
aside a judgment, rightful when rendered, but 
which cannot be affirmed but in violation 
of law, the judgment must be set aside. 
( 2 L. Ed. at 51 Emph.3:s is Supplied) 
The case of United States v. Chambers, 291 U.S. 217, 78 
L.Ed. 763, 54 S. Ct. 434, (1934) while not directly on 
point, is nevertheless instructive. There, appellant had 
pled guilty in a prosecution by indictment under the National 
Prohibition Act. The alleged offense occurred prior to the 
enactment of the Twenty-First Amendment, which repealed both 
the Eighteenth Amendment and the Act in question. After the 
ratification of the Twenty-First Amendment, appellant filed a 
plea in abatement, and the District Court dismissed the indictrri· 
The United States appealed. 
The Supreme Court of the United States affirmed noting: 
The continuance of the prosecution of the defendants 
after the repeal of the Eighteenth Amendment, for a 
violation of the National Prohibition Act alleged to 
have been connnitted in North Carolina, would involve 
an attempt to continue the application of the statuto7Y 
provisions after they had been deprived of force. . ~~s 
consequence is not altered by the fact that the crim 
-16-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
in question were alleged to have been committed 
while the National Prohibition Act was in effect 
The cont~nued p:osecution necessarily depended upon 
the continued life of the statute which the prosecution 
seeks to ~pply. ~n case a statute is repealed or 
rendered inoperative, no further proceedings can 
be had to enforce it in pending urosecutions unless 
competent authority has kept the.statute alive for 
that purpose. (78 L.Ed. at 765) 
In the case at bar we are not dealing with an entire 
statute, but only one element of a statute. And, of course, 
the "change" in the law is not due to a Constitutional Amendment, 
but rather due to a correction by this Court of cases previously, 
and erroneously, decided. ·Chambers, supra, an~ the instant case are 
identical as to the dispositve issues and facts: a legal 
standard which defines what conduct is a criminal offense is a 
matter of substantive law, and changes in the substantive law, 
from whatever source, are retroactively applied. 
Another interesting case is Massey v. United States, 291 
U.S. 608, 78 L.Ed. 1019, 54 S. Ct. 532 (1934), a per curiam 
opinion. The holding is concisely stated in the headnote to 
that case: 
Where, at the time of the repeal of the Eighteenth 
Amendment and the consequent implied repeal of the 
National Prohibition Act, a judgment of conviction 
for conspiracy to violate such act had n~t b7come 
final by reason of a stay by a_ Federal ~i7cuit Court 
of Appeals of its mandate pending a petition to the 
Supreme Court of the United States for a wri~ of 
certiorari to review its affirmance of such Judgment, 
the defendant is entitled to a vaction of the 
judgment and a dismissal of the indictment. (78 L.Ed. at 1019) 
Also see Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226, 12 L.Ed. 2d 882, 
84 S.Ct. 1814 (1964) for the retroactive effect of change in the 
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..., 
substantive law, subsequent to a conviction and the affi'rm 
' an ct 
of that conviction in an intermediate state appellate court. 
The Court there in reversing the conviction, also notes that a 
criTiinal conviction is not final while an appeal is pending. 
A case that is remarkably similar to the case at bar is 
State v. Grambrill, 81 A. 10 (Md. App. 1911), where defendant's 
demurrer to an indictment was sustained, and the state appealec 
The Court of Appeals affirmed. There, the statutory scheme 
contained an irreconcilable conflict relating to the punishment 
to be imposed for the offense charged. The Court applied tradi: 
statutory construction techniques, and found the most recent 
statute impliedly repealed the former, The Court held that in: 
penal case, 
"it is well 
of a law no 
imposed for 
settled that after the [implied] repeal 
penalty can be enforced nor punishment 
its violation when in force, . 
(81 A. at p. 12) 
Thus, the Court gave full retroactive effect to the 
subsequent change in substantive law. 
In summary, the instant case is not one where the relativ: 
recent prospective applciation rule of Linkletter, supra, is 
applicable. The issues here are of substantive law, not 
procedure. The instant case is not a collateral attack of a 
final judgment (in which case appellant concedes, under even 
the "Blackstonian view", relief would normally be unavailable), 
but rather it is a direct appeal of a pending case within the 
judicial system. 
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Resnondent urges that the trial court's error in the 
law, and its instructions 
"did not significantly impair the fact finding 
process in this case[,)" 
(R. 77) 
in an apparent attempt to bolster its statement that the error 
was not prejudicial. (R. 80) It is at once obvious that respondent 
is applying an incorrect procedural standard to the question 
of retroactivity, and that in fact the trial court's error 
was as prejudicial to appellant as possible. The trial court's 
incorrect instruction of law allowed the jury to convict appellant 
of a felony without finding beyond a reasonable doubt all 
elements of the offense charged. 
In his dissent in State v. Durrant, supra, Justice 
Maughan noted that under the Model Penal Code (from which the 
Utah Criminal Code's criminal homicide section was patterned), 
. . . death caused by an intoxicated driver may be 
manslaughter, a felony of the second degree or 
negligent homicide, a felony of the third degree. 
The legislature departed from the provisions of 
the Model Penal Code and made negligent homicide 
a Class A misdemeanor and included automobile 
homicide, a felony of the third degree. 
(561 P.2d at 1061) 
Under a proper instruction, the jury could have found that 
a crucial element of the felony charged, a criminal intent, was 
not present. Ap llant is entitled to have the jury find 
beyond a reasonable doubt all of the elements of the offense 
for which he is charged, at trial. It is not enough to have 
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respondent infer that such elements ex;sted ;n h" 
L L is brief on 
appeal (R. 76). 
Indeed, respondent states that, as to the Court's 
instruction No. 25 
. a reasonable jury could not fail to understand 
that they could not convict the appellant for 
merely being negligent." (R. 76) 
Yet, as to the criminal negligence element of the 
offense charged, that instruction stated only 
"3. That the defendant so operated or drove the 
motor vehicle in a negligent manner, 
It is clear that the given instruction invited the jury 
to convict on a finding of mere negligence, and further, 
that it gave the jury no guidelines whatsoever in determining·;: 
conduct constituted sufficient negligence under the statute. 
In effect the instruction left the matter to the whim of the 
jury. 
Here, appellant requested instructions that correctly sta• 
the law, but instead the trial court gave instructions which 
erroneously stated the law. Appellant is entitled to a reversa: 
A reversal could not "prejudice" the State, since at ~ 
appellant requested the proper instructions. No new grounds 
or issues have been "cooked up" to defeat justice. Rather, 
appellant's rights have been abridged, over his objection. 
Finally, it must again be noted that respondent's content: 
that this is a procedural case which gives rise to a question 
of retrospective or prospective application are completely 
erroneous. The question here presented is not of retrospective 
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application. Rather, it is a matter of stare decisis, The law 
of Chavez, supra, controls all future cases, as well as cases 
pending in the judicial system at the date that decision was 
handed down by this Court. 
Therefore, appellant's conviction must be reversed. 
POINT II 
THE CONSTITUTIONS OF UTAH AND THE UNITED STATES ARE 
OFFENDED IF THERE IS NO RELIGIOUS EXCEPTION TO 
THE GENERAL RULE OF SCHMERBER. 
Respondent argues in his brief (R. 7) that in Schmerber v. 
California, 384 U.S. 757, 16 L.Ed. 2d 908, 86 S.Ct, 1826 (1966), 
the Supreme Court did not recognize a religious exception to the 
general rule of the case and that, therefore, this court should 
decline to do so. 
Schmerber, supra, was a five to four decision, holding that 
a compulsory blood test, ordered by a law enforcement officer, 
upon probable cause and after a legal arrest, but without 
a search warrant, was not offensive to the Fourteenth, Fifth and 
Fourth Amendments to the United States Constitution. 
Justice Brennan wrote for the majority. He found due 
process was not offended on the authority of Breithaupt v. Abram, 
352 U.S. 432, 1 L.Ed. 2d 448, 77 S.Ct. 408 (1957), since the 
withdrawal of blood from Mr. Schmerber did not offend the 
sense of justice in the manner of Rochin v, California, 342 U.S. 
165, 72 S.Ct. 205, 96 L.Ed. 183 (1952). Of course, Mr. Schmerber 
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was not a Navajo, nor did he have any other religious or 
psychological revulsion to the withdrawal of his blood. 
Justice Brennan also held the Fifth Amendment proscriptioi 
against a defendant's being compelled to give evidence against 
himself was not violated, because that amendment reaches only 
testimonial evidence, and not real or physical evidence. 
As to the Fourth Amendment right to be free from 
unreasonable searches and seizures, Justice Brennan noted 
The overriding function of the Fourth Amendment is to 
protect personal privacy and dignity against unwarranted 
intrusion by the State. In Wolf we recognized "[t]he 
security of one's privacy against arbitrary intrusion by 
the police" as being "at the core of the Fourth 
Amendment" and "basic to a free society" . 
We reaffirmed that broad view of the Amendment's purpose 
in applying the federal exclusionary rule to the 
States in Mapp. 
The values protected by the Fourth Amendment thus 
substantially overlap those the Fifth Amendment 
helps to protect. 
Because we are dealing with intrusions into the human 
body rather than with state interferences with 
property relationships or private papers- "houses, papers 
and effects"- we write on a clean slate .. 
We begin with the assumption that once the privilege 
against self-incrimination has been found not to bar 
compelled intrusions into the body for blood to be 
analyzed for alcohol content, the Fourth. Amendmen~ 's . , 
proper function is to cons train, not against a~l ir;t~usio 
as such, but against intrusions which ar~ not ~ustifled 
in the circumstances, or which are made in an impr~per 
manner. In other words, the questions we mus~ ~eci~e 
in this case are whether the police were justified in 
requiring petitioner to submit to the blood test, . 
and whether the means and procedures employed in tak~ 
his blood respected relevant Fourth Amendment standa~5, of reasonableness. (16 L.Ed. 2d at 917-918 Emphasis 
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Justice Brennan continued, discussing the search of the 
person, incident to arrest, exception to the Fourth Amendment's 
warrant requirement, noting; 
. the mere fact of a lawful arrest does not 
end our inquiry. The suggestion of [the cases 
validating searches of the person incident to 
arrest] apparently rests on two factors- first, 
there may be more immediate danger of concealed 
weapons or of destruction of evidence under the 
direct control of the accused; second, once a 
search of the arrested person for weapons is 
permitted, it would be both impractical and 
unnecessary to enforcement of the Fourth 
Amendment's purpose to attempt to confine the 
search to those objects alone. Whatever the 
validity of these considerations in general, they 
have little applicability with respect to searches 
involving intrusions beyond the body's surface. 
The interests in human dignity and privacy which 
the Fourth Amendment protects forbid any such 
intrusions on the mere chance that desired 
evidence might be obtained. In the absence of a 
clear indication that in fact such evidence will 
be found, these fundamental human interests require 
law officers to suffer the risk that such evidence 
may disappear unless there is an immediate search. 
We are told that the percentage of alcohol in the 
blood begins to diminish shortly after drinking 
stops, as the body functions to eliminate it 
from the system. Particularly in a case such as 
this, where time had to be taken to bring the accused 
to a hospital and to investigate the scene of the 
accident there was no time to seek out a magistrate 
and secu~e a warrant. Given these special facts, 
we conclude that the attempt to secure evidence of_ 
blood alcohol content in this case was an appropriate 
incident to petitioner's arrest. 
Similarly, we are satisfied that the test chosen to 
measure netitioner's blood-alcohol level was a 
reasonable one. Petitioner is not one of the 
few who on grounds of fear, concern for health, or 
religious scruple might prefer som~ other me~n~ of 
testing, such as the ·~reathalyzer test pe~itioner 
refused. We need not decide whether such wishes would 
have to be respected .... 
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W7 thu~ conclude that the present record shows no 
violation of petitioner's right under the Fourth 
and Fourteenth Amendments to be free of unreasonabl 
searches and seizures. It bears repeating howevere 
that we reach this ·ud ment onl on the fa~ts of th~ 
present recor . T e integritl o an in ivi ual s 
person is a cherished value o our society. That 
we today hold that the Constitution does not forbid 
the States minor intrusions into an individual's 
body under stringently limited conditions in no way 
indicates that it permits more substantial intrusions 
or intrusions under other conditions. ' 
Affirmed. ( 6 L.Ed. 2d at 919-920 Emphasis Sr 
Chief Justice Warren "reiterated" his dissent in 
Breithaupt v. Abram, 352 U.S. 432, 440, 1 L.Ed. 2d 448, 453, 
77 S. Ct. 408 (195 7) , "as the basis on which to reverse this 
conviction." (16 L.Ed. 2d at 921). Breithauot, supra, was a 
case based on similar facts. There, oetitioner had been involve: 
in a collision in which three occupants of another car had been 
killed, and petitioner had been seriously injured. An almost 
empty pint of whiskey was found in petitioner's glove box. 
Petitioner was taken to a hospital emergency room, where, 
while he was unconscious, the smell of alcohol was detected on 
his breath. A state patrolman directed that a blood sample be 
withdrawn, which was subsequently shown to contain a .17% of 
alcohol. Evidence regarding the blood sample was introduced, 
over petitioner's objection, at his trial for involuntary 
mans laughter. Upon conviction, petitioner did not appeal, rathe: 
he sought habeas corpus relief from the Supreme Court of 
New Mexico, on the ground that admitting the result of the 
involuntary blood test violated his rights under the Fourteenth 
Amendment. The State Court denied the Writ, and the Supreme 
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Court of the United States affirmed, after granting certiorari. 
Justice Clark, writing for the majority, held that 
Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 93 L.Ed. 1782, 69 S.Ct. 1359 
(1949), which held the States were not bound to apply the 
exclusionary rule to evidence obtained in an illegal search, 
controlled the case. It is implicit that the involuntary blood 
test was illegal. It was also held that Rochin v. California, 
supra, was not violated because the "sense of justice" referred 
to in that case was not offended. 
The Chief Justice's dissent, in which Justices Black and 
Douglas joined, stated 
"The judgment in this case should be reversed if 
[Rochin, supra) is to retain its vitality and stand 
as more than an instance of personal revulsion. 
I cannot agree with the Court whent it says 'we see 
nothing comparable here to the facts of Rochin.' 
It seems to me the essential elements of~ases 
are the same and the same result should follow." 
(1 L.Ed. 2d at 448) 
Justice Warren acknowledged the State's interest in 
enforcing traffic laws and protecting the public, but found that 
the state interest in Rochin, supra, (curbing narcotics traffic) 
was at least equally important. Indeed, he found the two cases 
indistinguishable. 
The Chief Justice criticized the majority's finding that, 
unlike Rochin, supra, there was nothing "brutal" or "offensive" 
in the involuntary blood taking, noting 
The Court has not kept separate the component parts of 
the problem. Essentially there are two: the character 
of the invasion of the body and the expression of t~e 
victim's will; the latter may be manifested by physical 
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r~sistance. Of course, one may consent to having 
hi~ blood extracted or his stomach pumped and thereb 
waive any due process objection. In that limited y 
sense the expression of the will is significant. 
But where.there is no affirmative consent, I cannot 
see that it should make any difference whether one 
states unequivocally that he objects or resorts to 
physical.violence in protest or is in such condition 
that he is unable to protest . . . . Since there 
clearly was no consent to the blood test, it is the 
nature of the invasion of the body that should be 
determinative of the due process question here 
presented. The Court's opinion suggests that an 
invasion is "brutal" or "offensive" only if the 
police use force to overcome a suspect's resistance. 
By its recital of the facts in Rochin- the references 
to a "considerable struggle" and the fact that the 
stomach pump was "forcibly used" - the Court finds 
Rochin distinguishable from this case. I cannot 
accept an analysis that would make physical resistance 
by a prisoner a prerequisite to the existence of his 
constitutional rights. Apart from the irrelevant 
factor of physical resistance, the techniques used in 
this case and in Rochin are comparable. In each the 
operation was performed by a doctor in a hospital. 
In each there was an extraction of body fluids. Neither 
operation normally causes any lasting ill effects , . 
The stomach pumpt too is a common and accepted way 
of making tests and relieving distress. But it does 
not follow from the fact that a technique is a product 
of science or is in common, consensual use for other 
purposes that it can be used to extract evidence from 
a criminal defendant without his consent .... Only 
personal reaction to the stomach pump and the blood 
test can distinquish them. To base the restriction 
which the Due Process Clause imposes on state 
criminal procedures upon such reactions is to build on 
shifting sands. We should, in my opinion, hold that 
due process means at least that law-enforcement officers 
in their efforts to obtain evidence from persons 
suspected of crime must stop short of bruising th~ 
body, breaking skin, puncturing tissue.or extracting 
body fluids, whether they contemplate it by force or 
stealth. (1 L.Ed. 2d at 454-455) 
Schmerber, supra, was also forcefull dissented from by 
Justices Black and Douglas. 
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Justice Black disagreed 
"with the Court's holding that California did not 
vio~ate the p7tit~o~er'~ constitutional right 
against self-incrimination when it compelled 
him, against his will, to allow a doctor to puncture 
his blood vessels in order to extract a samule 
of blood and analyze it for alcoholic content 
and then used that analysis as evidence to co~vict 
petitioner of a crime. (1 L.Ed. 2d at 921) 
Justice Black found the testimonial vs. real evidence 
distinction relied upon by the majority to be wholly unconvincing, 
noting the court had cited no precedent of its own in so 
limiting the scope of the Fifth Amendment. Acknowledging 
Wigmore's "scholarly precedent" for the approach, he stated: 
Though my admiration for Professor Wigmore's 
scholarship is great, I regret to see the word 
he used to narrow the Fifth Amendment's protection 
play such a major part in any of this Court's 
opinions. 
I am happy that the Court itself refuses to follow 
Professor Wigmore' s implication that the Fifth 
Amendment goes no further than to bar the use of 
forced self-incrimination statements coming from 
a "person's own lips." It concedes, as it must 
so long as Boyd v. United States (citation omitted) 
stands, that the Fifth Amendment bars a State from 
compelling a person to produce papers he has that 
might tend to incriminate him. It is a strange 
hierarchy of values that allows the State to extract 
a human being's blood to convict him of a crime 
because of the blood's content but proscribes 
compelled production of his lifeless papers. 
Certainly there could be few papers that would have any 
more "testimonial" value to convict a man of drunken 
driving than would an analysis of the alcoholic content 
of a human being's blood introduced in evidence at a 
trial for driving while under the influence of . 
alcohol. In such a situation blood, of course, is ~ot 
oral testimony given by an accused but it can ce7tainly 
"coimnunicate" to a court ahd jury the fact of guilt. 
-27-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
A ~as ic erro~ in the Court's holding and opinion is its 
fai~ure to give the Fifth Amendment's protection 
against co~pulsory self-incrimination 
the broad and liberal construction that Counselman 
and other opinions of this Court have declared it 
ought to have. 
The liberal construction given the Bill of Rights' 
guarantee in Boyd v. United States, supra which 
Professor Wigmore criticized severely see 8 
Wigmore, Evidence, §2264 (ed ed. 1940), on. 366-373 
makes that one among the greatest constit~tional ' 
decisions of this Court .... The court 
announced a rule of constitutional internretation 
that has been generally followed ever since, 
particularly in judicial construction of Bill of 
Rights guarantees: 
"A close and literal construction [of constitutional 
provisions for the security of persons and property] 
deprives them of half their efficacy, and leads 
to gradual depreciation of the right, as if it 
consisted more in sound than in substance. It is 
the duty of courts to be watchful for the constitutional 
rights of the citizen, and against any stealthy 
encroachments thereon." 
The Court today departs from the teachings of 
Boyd. Petitioner Schmerber has undoubtedly been 
compelled to give his blood "to furnish evidence 
against himself", yet the Court holds that this is 
not forbidden by the Fifth Amendment. With all 
deference I must say that the Court here gives the 
Bill of Rights' safeguard against compulsory 
self-incrimination a construction that would 
generally be considered too narrow and technical . 
even in the interpretation of an ordinary col!llllercial 
contract. (10 L.Ed. 2d at 922-923) 
Justice Douglas dissented in Schmerber, supra, by adherin1 
to his dissent, and the dissent of the Chief Justice, in~ 
v. Abram, supra. Douglas added, 
We are dealing with the right of privacy which, since 
the Breithaupt case, we have held to be withi~ the 
penumbra of some specific gu~rantee~ of.the B~ll of 
Rights. Griswold v. Connecticut (citation om~tted(, · 
Thus, the Fifth AmendIDent marks "a zone of privacy 
which the Government may not force a person to 
surrender. (Citation omitted) Likewise the 
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Fourth Amendment recognizes that right when it 
guarantees the right of the people to be secure 
"in their persons". Ibid. Ho clearer invasion 
of t~is right of pr~vacy can be imagined than 
forcible blood-letting of the kind involved 
here. (1 L.Ed. 2d at 924) 
The analysis of Schmerber v. California, supra, shows 
that when that case was decided it was not at all clear 
what the state of the law in question was. It was recognized, 
however, both in Brennan's opinion for the majority, and the 
dissents, that the holding represented the fringes of police 
behavior that was constitutionally permissible. 
Indeed, it can be argued that Schmerber, supr~ was 
incorrectly decided, and that after Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 
6 L.Ed. 2d 1081, 81 S.Ct. 1684, 84 A.L.R. 2d 933 (1961), the result 
should have been a reversal. In any event, Schmerber, supr~ was 
meant to be, and should be, confined strictly to its facts. 
It is clear that, when as in the case at bar, there are 
alternative, reliable scientific procedures available to 
determine the alcoholic content of the blood (e.g. breathalyzer, 
urine tests), and when the accused has affirmatively expressed 
his lack of consent to an extraction of his blood, based on 
religious grounds, then the results of such a test cannot 
Constitutionally be used to obtain a conviction. Any other 
interpretation of Schmerber, supra, would render the rights protected 
by Fourth, Fifth, and First Amendments subject to the discretion, 
whim, and degree of force a law enforcement officer might decide 
to be appropriate on an ad hoc basis. Indeed, the current 
scheme of forced blood tests is surely an unfortunate situation, 
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• 
and one frought with potential abuses and hazards. An accused 
with a religious conviction against such tests, who is com]lellea 
to so submit, might easily suffer severe, and perhaps permanent 
emotional distress as a result. Similarly, one with a 
neuropathic phobia of needles might also suffer serious emotiona: 
harm. Or, in their resistance to such palpable assaults on 
their persons it is easily foreseeable that they might physicall: 
resist, causing injuries to others, and ultimately themselves. 
More frightening would be the result if such a forcible blood 
extraction were performed against the will of a hempohiliac, 
in which case serious physical injury, if not death, would surel; 
result. 
The cases respondent cites are not on point here. Responc' 
cases are basically First Amendment cases, and while certainly 
freedom of religion is integral to the case at bar, it is 
nevertheless in quite a different context here than it is res1)once· 
cited cases. 
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 32 L.Ed. 2d 15, 92 S.C. 
1526 (1972) was a case affirming the reversal of convictions for 
violating a compulsory school attendance law, based on the First 
' f f · f 1 · · on While the co. Amendment s guarantee o ree exercise o re igi . 
there did find, 
". . . that the record in this case abundantly supports 
the claim that the traditional way of life of the 
Amish is . . . one of deep religious conviction, 
shared by an organized group, and intimately related 
to daily living(.]" (32 L.Ed.2d at 25) 
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it did not purport to set down any yard-stick-like test to 
determine the sincerity of religious conviction, especially 
as applied to the search and seizure context of the 
intant case. 
In United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 13 L.Ed. 2d 733, 
85 S.Ct. 850 (1965) and Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 
26 L.Ed. 2d 308, 90 S. Ct. 1792 (1970) the. 
tests of religious conviction, are in the context of one 
convicted of refusing to submit to induction to the draft, 
claiming the status of conscientious objector. The present 
case is tangentially related, at the most. Seeger, supra, however, 
noted that the status, as controlled by legislation, embraced 
all religions, as opposed to political, philosophical, or 
sociological views. 
United States v. Kuch, 288 F. Supp. 439 (D.D.C. 1968) has 
nothing to do with the search and seizure area. Rather, it denies, 
in its facts, a First Amendment immunity to laws prohibiting the 
use of marijuana and LSD. In the instant case, the focus is 
not on the First Amendment, except as it defines a zone of 
privacy from which one is free from unreasonable searches and 
seizures. Rather, here the focus is on the reasonableness of 
the search technique employed, the importance of the individual's 
bodily integrity and dignity, and the alternative methods 
available. In short, the tests advocated by respondent are 
taken out of their proper context, and, under the instant facts, 
are misleading and inappropriate. The interests involved in 
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Yoder, Seeger, Welsh, and Kuch, all supra, are not related 
to the interests involved in the case at bar. 
Here, defendant's interests may be summarized as his 
right to personal integrity; his right to not incriminate himself 
his right to be free from unreasonable searches, and to be 
protected by a neutral and detached magistrate; and his right 
to be secure in his religious beliefs and scruples. The State's. 
interests include protecting the public's safety on the highways 
and decreasing the number of drunken drivers. The State has 
chosen the criminal justice system to, in part, vindicate its 
interests. Our judicial system places certain barriers to the 
use of the criminal law, regardless of the guilt· of an accused, 
including the protection of the due process clause of the Fourtee-
Amendment, and the Fourth and Fifth Amendments of the Constitutic:' 
of the United States. The interests that these amendments 
protect must be held to outweigh those asserted by the states 
(Mapp v. Ohio, supra, Rochin v. California, supra) . 
One more point must be made here. Respondent states: 
.. the appellant failed in his burden to establish 
the validity and sincerity of his religious beliefs." 
(R.12) 
The rule of law in this instance is almost too settled 
to bear citation. Any search or seizure without a warrant is 
per se unreasonable, and in violation of the Fourth, and 
Fourteenth Amendments, The burden is always on the prosecution 
to prove that the search falls into one of the recognized 
exceptions to the warrant requirements, and if the state fails 
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in its burden, the evidence is inadmissible, as it was illegally 
obtained. See Chimel v. California 395 U.S. 752, 23 L.Ed. 2d 
685, 89 S.Ct. 2034 (1969). 
It would seem that the instant case may well be one of 
first impression. This Court should find that under the 
Fourteenth, Fifth, Fourth, and First Amendments to the Constitution 
of the United States, a "religious" exception exists to the 
general rule of Schmerber, suora, and that Schmerber, must 
be strictly confined to its facts. 
POINT III 
INVOLUNTARY BLOOD TESTS VIOLATE ARTICLE I 
SECTION 12 OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION. 
Article I Section 12 of the Constitution of Utah deals with 
the rights of those accused of a crime. In relevant part it 
provides: 
... The accused shall not be compelled to give 
evidence against himself; a wife shall not be 
compelled to testify against her husband, .. 
(Emphasis Su~plied) 
The protection provided by the framers of the Utah 
Constitution is expressly broader than the right to be free 
of self-incrimination contained in the Fifth Amendment to the 
federal Constitution, which states in relevant part: 
. nor shall any person . . . be compelled in 
any criminal case to-be a witness against himself. 
-"TEiiiphasis 'Supplied) 
Clearly, the Utah Constitution's prohibition against 
self-incrimination goes to "evidence", both real and testimonial. 
Note that the spousal privilege is limited to testimony. 
the Fifth Amendment is aimed at the accused as a witness. 
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as to self-incrimination, Utah's framers expressly provided that 
an accused cannot be compelled to give evidence against himsel; 
Respondent is able to cite only an admitted "dictum" 
in State v. Van Dam, 554 P.2d 1234 (Utah 1976) in support of 
its contention that the Article ::: Section 12 i:iroscription of the 
of compelled evidence is limited to "testimonial" evidence. 
Appellant again asserts that the law on this issue is settled, 
and not open to question, by the holding of this Court in 
State v. Sirmay, 40 Utah 525, 122 P. 748 (1912), a case decided 
only sixteen years after the section in question was adopted, 
when the spirit and intent of the framer's was fresher to 
the Court than it was when the dicta in Van Dam, supra was 
uttered. As is pointed out in appellant's brief at pages 14 and 
15, Sirmay, supra. clearly holds that the self-incrimination prov::: 
of Article I Section 12 encompasses real as well as testimonial 
or communicative evidence, and that therefore such evidence may 
only be received upon an accused's affirmative consent. Indeed, 
in light of Sirmay, supra. and Article I Section 12, it would seer 
that an involuntary blood test is prohibited even if an 
otherwise valid search warrant were issued. Of course, this 
question is not before the Court, because in the instant case, 
no impartial magistrate was interjected to deterr'.li.ne the 
reasonableness of the extraction of appellant's blood. Rather, 
the officer on the scene made this decision for himself. 
In light of Article I Section 12, and Section 14 
( h . h h"b"t bl h s) si·rmay, supra, and the w ic pro i i s unreasona e searc e , -· 
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facts of the case at bar (including the breaking of the skin 
and blood vessels to extract blood), it seems clear that the 
involuntary taking of blood complained of violated the 
Constitution of Utah, as Article I Section 12 is not limitec. 
to preclude only testimonial evidence. 
While Sirmay, supr~ expressly holds the position here 
asserted, it is by no means the only authority for that position. 
Note Justice Black's dissent in Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 
757, 773, 16 L.Ed. 2d 908, 921, 86 S.Ct. 1826, 1837 (1966), 
discussed at length in Point II, supra. 
In Green v. State, 259 S.W. 2d 142 (Ark. 1953) the 
Supreme Court of Arkansas held that Article II Section 8 of that 
state's constitution, which provides: 
"nor shall any person be compelled, in any criminal 
case, to be a witness against himself." 
(259 S.W. 2d at 143) 
prohibited compelling an accused to submit to a physical exam, 
and then using the results of that exam as evidence against him. 
The distinction between "real" and "testimonial" evidence was 
not discussed, and was apparently considered irrelevant. 
In Trarmnell v. State, (Tx. Cr. 1956) 287 S.W. 2d 487, a 
driving while intoxicated conviction was reversed on the ground 
that analysis of an accused's blood was inadmissible to prove 
intoxication where the State had failed to prove the accused 
had consented to the extraction of his blood. The State 
Constitution was held to be offended. 
-35-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
In United States v. Townsend (D.D.C. 1957) 151 F. Supp 
378, defendant had been convicted of "taking immoral, improper 
and indecent liberties with a female under 16 years old." His 
motion for a new trial was granted on the ground that 
evidence obtained from a compelled physical examination was 
inadmissible under the Fourth and Fifth Amendments. The Court 
noted such evidence was not only unreliable, but offensive 
to justice as well. Further. the presence or absence of force 
was held not determinative of either the issue of consent, or 
the violation of Constitutional guarantees of due process. 
In State v. Munroe, 22 Conn. Supp. 321, 171 A.2d 419 
(Circuit Court 1561) it was held that results from physical t~ 
to determine the blood's content of alcohol, which an accused 
has consented to, are admissble. Likewise when an accused is 
unconscious when the test is conducted. The court found, howev1 
that when duress is used to compel the test, the results are 
inadmissible under the "rules of evidence". 
In State v. Merrow, 203 A. 2d 659 (Me. 1965) it was held 
an accused must voluntarily consent to the taking of a blood 
sample in order for it to be admissible as evidence of intoxica 
in a prosecution for driving while intoxicated. Opinion of 
Justices, 255 A.2d 643 (Me.1969) is in accord. 
State v. Weltha, 292 N.W. 148 (Iowa 1940) holds it uncon 
tional to take blood from an accused, to use as evidence agains 
him, even if the accused were unconscious at the time. 
search warrant, the State Constitution was offended. 
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Compton v. People, 444 P.2d 263 (Colo. 1968) is an interesting 
post-Schrnerber case. It holds that a blood test without consent 
does not violate due process, but that nevertheless it is 
inadmissible into evidence under statute. In order for a blood 
alcohol test to be admissible, there must be an affirmativP., 
finding that the accused consented to the test. There a 
conviction for causing a death by operating an automobile while 
under influence of intoxicating liquor was reversed. 
People v. Todd, 59 Ill. 2d 534, 322 N.E. 2d 447 (1975) 
in another case involving an unusual statute. There, consent is 
required to make the results of a blood test admissible in a 
prosecution for driving under the influence. 
In Gilbert v. Leach, 62 Mich. App. 722, 233 N.W. 2d 840, 
aff'd 397 Mich 384, 245 N.W. 2d 18 (1975), a civil case, the 
results of a blood alcohol test was held properly excluded since 
it was unconsented to. A free, voluntary and knowledgeable 
consent is required. The case was based on the State Constitution's 
prohibition of unreasonable searches and seizures. 
Cox v. State, 395 P.2d 954 (Okl. Cr. 1964 ) holds that 
privilege against self-incrimination applies to real evidence 
as well as testimonial. While this case has been overruled, 
it nevertheless represents the sounder position of law. 
In State v. Groyet, 132 A.2d 623 (Vt. 1957) and State v. 
Johnson, 135 N.\'7. 2d 518 (Iowa 1965) it is held that consensual 
blood taking is permissible. In State v. Haley, 318 P.2d 1084 
(Mont. 1957), it was held that where, with written and oral 
consent, it was held constitutional to admit the results of a blood 
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test in a manslaughter prosecution based on a drunken driving 
incident. Also see Ex Parte Rebersak, 106 Ohio App. 425, 7 Ohic 
Ops 2d 172, 78 Ohio L Abs 280, 150 N.E. 2d 869 (1958) where it 
is held that law enforcement officers may request, but not 
demand, a blood test. The constitutional right to refuse 
such a demand is "absolute", 
In summary, prior to the Schrnerber supra, decision, and 
Breithaupt, supra, the "weight of authority" as to the Constituti.; 
of compelled physical tests, under various state Constitutional 
proscriptions against self-incrimination, as well as the view 
towards the Fifth Amendment to the federal Constitution, was 
that such involuntary tests were impermissible. (See Green v. S: 
supra, 359 S.W. 2d at 143) In Utah, under State v. Sirmay, supn 
this was clearly the case. Schmerber and Breithaupt, both supra, 
are anomalies, and while they control as to the federal 
Constitutional questions, the result under Article I Section 12 
of the Constitution of Utah is a matter already decided by this 
Court in Sirmay, supra and the clear wording of the section in 
question. Therefore, appellant's conviction in the case at bar 
must be reversed. 
POINT IV 
SECTION 76-5-207(2) IS UNCONSTITUTIONALLY OVERBROAD, 
AND APPELLANT HAS STANDING TO SO ASSERT. 
In addition to appellant's position on this issue as 
stated in Point C of his brief (A-13), it is further noted that 
§76-5-207(2) is unconstitutionally over-broad in light of 
Article I Section 12 of the Utah Constitution, discussed at lengt' 
in Point III, supra. 
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ic Respondent asserts that as this issue is raised for the 
first time on appeal, it should be dismissed. (R.26) Appellant 
responds that the issue here is sufficiently significant 
that this Court should decide it. Further, the procedural 
rule respondent seeks to invoke is not proper here, since the 
underlying rationale of the so-called "contemporaneous objection 
:i.; rule" barring review is not served. That rationale is that if a 
timely objection is made at trial, it can be ruled on, thus 
permitting the trial court to avoid evidentiary error. See 
State v. Gordon, 549 P.2d 886 (Kan. 1976). Here, no evidentiary 
S: error, as such is claimed. Rather, it is claimed that an entire 
,10 procedural aspect of a statute is invalid. The issue is one of 
·a, sufficient importance that this Court should hear it now on 
appeal, notwithstanding the failure to raise it at trial. 
Respondent's argument that appellant lacks standing 
(R.26) is circular, and is based on the conclusion that the 
statute was constitutionally applied to appellant. Obviously, 
it is for this Court, not respondent, to determine that question. 
As to §76-5-207(2), it should be noted that the section 
is expressly subject to the "rules of evidence". Therefore, 
simple construction of the statute, such that it is subject 
to the constitutions of the United States and Utah, as part 
of the "rules of evidence" will operate to save the statute. 
Similarly, an attempt to subrogate the Constitutions to the 
statute must fail. See State v. Munroe, 22 Conn. Supp. 321 
~ 171 A.2d 419 (1961): 
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"Where duress or force had been used in gaining 
incriminatory evidence from the accused such 
evidence has generally been excluded under a rule 
of evidence or because it so grossly did violence 
to the sanctity of the person as to be abhorrent 
to our sense of justice and thus violative of due 
process . . " (171 A. 2d at 421) 
• 
In Green v. State, 259 S.W. 2d 142 (Ark. 1953) the issue 
of statutes and compulsory mental examinations was discussed: 
A statute compelling the defendant to submit to a 
mental examination in order that a pyschiatrist 
may form an opinion to his sanity, and then 
permitting the alienist to testify in court .. 
is on the borderline of the constitutional 
interdiction against compelling one to testify 
against himself; and although the statute has been 
held constitutional, [citation omitted], it should 
not be stretched, enlarged, or expanded. 
(259 S.W. 2d at 144) 
Here of course we are dealing with an entirely different 
type of statute. But §76-5-207(2) is surely on the "borderline" 
of constitutionality, especially as to Article I Section 12 
self-incrimination provision, as well as the Fourth and Fourteen'. 
Amendments, and Article I Sections 7 and ll:- of the Utah Constituc 
Indeed, under the sweeping language of §76-5-207 (2), it can 
only be saved by a construction which subjects it to the rigors 
of both the federal and state constitutions in question. 
Nor must this Court wait for the Supreme Court of the 
United States to decide the federal Constitutional issues involv< 
herein, as respondent asserts (R.29). This Court obviously 
has jurisdiction to decide federal Constitutional issues, and 
only this Court can decide questions raised under the Constitutir 
of Utah. 
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Finally, as to the Constitutionality of §76-5-207(2), 
note United States v. Cameron (C.A. 9 Calif.) 538 F.2d 254, 
an admittedly shocking case. It is there held that, as to 
body searches, Fourth Amendment standards are stricter than 
those of due process, and that the Constitution is violated 
when less obtrusive methods are available, but not employed, 
to obtain the desired specimen or exam. 
POINT V 
APPELLANT DID NOT CONSENT TO THE EXTRACTION OF 
HIS BLOOD. 
Respondent's assertion that appellant consented to 
the extraction of his blood is simply untenable (R.14). 
It is uncontradicted that the peace officer in question 
repeatedly told appellant that force would be used to take 
the test if he resisted. Appellant repeatedly stated 
he did not want the test. Under these facts, while appellant 
submitted to the test, he did not consent. 
It should be noted that, as to the events at the hospital, 
where appellant placed himself on a gurney and allowed blood 
to be withdrawn without physical resistance, that very similar 
facts occurred in Rochin, supra, when the petitioner's stomach 
was pumped. There, a struggle occurred at petitioner's 
apartment, where he had been arrested, but not at the hospital, 
where petitioner was subdued and not violent. Nevertheless it 
could not be argued that he consented to the stomach pump 
procedure. See Breithaupt v. Abram, supra, dissent of 
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q 
Chief Justice Harren, 1 L.Ed. 2d at 454, fn.l. 
Respondent's statement that no coercion was involved 
(R.17) is similarly not true. The coercion was not physical, 
but the threats of force were sufficient coercion to nullify am 
"consent". 
Respondent cites Schneckloth v. Bustamante, 412 U.S. 218 
36 L.Ed. 2d 854, 93 S.Ct. 2041, (1973) in support of its 
position that the instant appellant consented to have his blooc 
withdrawn. There, the driver of a vehicle, Alcala, consented 
to a search of his automobile. (Alacala' s reply to the request 
was "sure, go ahead". Cf. appellant's responses here) The searc: 
turned uP evidence which was used to convict Bustamante for 
possessing a check with the intent to defraud. 
The holding of that case was that Alcala's consent 
to the search was valid even though the police had not informed 
him he had a right to refuse the search. The Court held that, 
in this Fourth Amendment context, "voluntary" consent did 
not require knowledge of the right to refuse. It is equally 
clear that a coerced consent is invalid. 
In contrast, the instant appellant repeatedly stated 
he did not want the test. He was repeatedly told force would 
be used. In Schneckloth, supra, the Court quoted an earlier 
case dealing with the voluntariness of confessions: 
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"Is the confession the product of an essentially 
free and unconstrained choice by its maker? If 
it is, if he has willed to confess, it may be used 
against him. If it is not, if his will has been 
overborne and his capacity for self determination 
critically impaired, the use of his confession 
offends due process." (36 L.Ed. 2d at 862 ) 
Insofar as State v. Van Dam, 554 P.2d 1324 (Utah 1976) 
makes physical resistance the test for lack of consent, 
it is both incorrect, and poorly reasoned. Such a test invites 
the use of intimidation to obtain consents, and should not be 
sanctioned. Indeed the better position is that force is not 
determinative of consent (Gilbert v. Leach, 62 Mich. App. 722, 
233 N.W. 2d 840, affd 397 Mich. 384, 245 N.W. 2d 18 (1976 ), 
Escamilla v. State, 556 S.W. 2d 796, on reh. 561 S.W. 2d 205 
(1977 Tx. Cr.), United States v. Townsend, 151 F. Supp. 378 (D.D.C. 
1959)). 
Here, where appellant did not physically resist, but 
was coerced to allow the blood to be taken, it cannot be 
argued that he consented to the test. 
CONCLUSION 
In summary, appellant reasserts his claim that 
&41-6-44.5 (1953 as amended) was not complied with; and that 
§76-1-401 (1953 as amended) is a bar to a subsequent prosecution 
of the automobile homicide charge that is the subject of this appeal. 
Since State v. Chavez, 605 .P.2d 1226 (Utah 1980) decides 
the point of law at issue in this appeal in appellant's favor; 
and since the instant case was, and is pending in the judicial 
process at all relevant times (i.e. this is not yet a final 
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judgment), appellant's conviction must be reversed. 
Further, appellant's conviction must be reversed because 
of the religious exception to the rule of Schmerber, supra; 
because the taking of appellant's blood without his 
consent violated Article I Section 12 of the Utah Constitution, 
and because §76-5-207 is unconstitutionally overbroad. 
Respectfully submitted this ~day of May, 1980. 
~~~ RONALD J. <tE GIC 
O'Connell & eng ch 
Attorneys at Law 
44 Exchange Place 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorney for Appellant 
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